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Abstract
This paper analyzes various distributed storage systems that use data
fragmentation and dispersal as a way of protection.
Existing solutions have been organized into two categories: bitwise
and structurewise. Systems from the bitwise category are operating on
unstructured data and in a uniform environment. Those having struc-
tured input data with predefined confidentiality level and disposing of a
heterogeneous environment in terms of machine trustworthiness were clas-
sified as structurewise. Furthermore, we outline high-level requirements
and desirable architecture traits of an eficient data fragmentation system,
which will address performance (including latency), availability, resilience
and scalability.
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1 Introduction
Outsourcing data storage to cloud-based services gains popularity among all
kinds of users, as it seems to be a reasonable alternative to a private cloud.
Cost aside, customers subordinate their choice of an adequate cloud provider
to various factors, particularly availability, security, and privacy of the stored
data.
Presented analysis focuses on one particular category of distributed storage
solutions: systems using data fragmentation and dispersion not only for avail-
ability, but also as a way of providing additional data security. Indeed, data
fragmentation is widely used for resilience and scalability purposes: it can be
found in the RAID technology [39], as well as in clusters like Apache Hadoop
[17]. However, the act of dividing data into fragments and dispersing these
fragments over multiple machines in order to discourage an attacker is not yet
widespread.
Fragmentation for security is not a new idea. It can be found in Adi Shamir’s
seminal paper from late 70s [49], where he addresses the problem of secure stor-
age and management of an encryption key. A more architectural Fragmentation-
Redundancy-Scattering technique was proposed in the 80s [18] with a design
separating sensitive data from non-confidential fragments and dispersing them
on separate physical devices. In the following decades, the idea of fragmen-
tation was applied to relational database systems [1, 15] and more recently,
it was used in the context of cloud or even multi-cloud architectures allowing
data separation [6, 9, 25, 16]. Today, we are facing new challenges along scal-
ability and public exposure: petabytes of data are to be protected over large
distributed systems of thousands of machines, some stored in public areas for
obvious reasons of cost reduction. Information dispersal appears to perfectly fit
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such multi-tenant environments 1.
This survey significantly expands the early work published in [27] and [37]
with more precise comparisons and descriptions including more systems and
references. Existing storage systems using fragmentation for security purpose
are organized into two categories: bitwise and structurewise. The first group
addresses the need for archiving data structures on storage architecture without
making any assumptions about the type of data or the kind of storage servers
(they are all considered identical in terms of trustworthiness). This group con-
tains not only academic proposals, but also novel commercial solutions. In the
second group, confidential data are stored on secured devices in contrast with
non-sensitive data that can be kept in public areas. Both categories of systems
are analyzed, with regards not only to security but also to memory use, data
resilience, key management and performance (including latency).
Outline This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains an analysis
of bitwise systems. Section 3 describes structurewise solutions. A discussion on
some fragmentation issues and recommendation with an insight into possible
future research tracks ends the survey.
2 Bitwise data fragmentation and dispersion
This section presents an overview of most notable bitwise fragmentation tech-
niques and systems. Section 2.1 describes data secrecy techniques based on frag-
mentation. Section 2.2 to Section 2.10 portrays other important characteristics
and elements proper to bitwise fragmentation systems: data redundancy, key
and fragments’ location management, integrity, data defragmentation, trusted
area, decoys, fragment size, and data deduplication.
Section 2.11 contains individual descriptions of eight selected bitwise frag-
mentation storage systems. It treats not only academic, but also commercial so-
lutions. Table 3 (containing academic solutions: PASIS[59], POTSHARDS[51],
GridSharing[53], DepSky[5] and CDStore[33]) and Table 4 (describing com-
mercial products: IBM Cloud Object Storage (previously Cleversafe R©) [45],
Symform[55, 56, 57] and SecureParser R© [47, 26, 30]) summarize their features
with regard to secure data dispersion: secrecy, key management, availability, in-
tegrity and recovery in case of loss of information, defragmentation processing,
location of the trusted element, number of fragments sufficient for an attacker to
recover data, and required storage space. In order to unify systems’ descriptions,
adequate notation and terminology were introduced in Table 1.
2.1 Data secrecy
During bitwise fragmentation processing initial data d are transformed into n
unrecognizable fragments that will be stored over n different physical locations.
1http://wikibon.org/wiki/v/3_Tenants_of_Security_and_the_Role_of
_Information_Dispersal
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Table 1: Notation and Terminology
d initial data
dsize size of the initial data
n total number of fragments corresponding to one initial data
k number of fragments required for the recovery of initial
data
p (ramp schemes) number of fragments not revealing any
information about the initial data
data chunk non-processed part of initial data, usually consecutive
bytes of data
data share protected piece of data, typically an encoded data chunk
fragment final fragment composed of data shares and stored in one
physical location
map information about the mapping between data and
fragments, fragments’ location and, if applicable, the order
of fragments
Data reconstruction is only possible when k of these fragments have been gath-
ered. Therefore, resulting data protection depends mainly on the two parame-
ters k and n, that define the dispersion scope. A higher value of k implicates
that the work required for an attacker to get an access to at least k storage
locations will be harder. A value of n close to k increase availability, but makes
this work even harder, as the choice of fragments is being limited. In a partic-
ular case, when k equals n, all fragments are needed for data recovery. Such
fragmentation processing is called an all-or-nothing transform.
Data dispersal is one obstacle on the way to data recovery, but the overall
data protection depends also on the protection strength of the algorithm used
for transformation of initial data into a set of corresponding fragments. This
second parameter corresponds to the difficulty level of obtaining some informa-
tion about the initial data from less than k fragments. Information-theoretic
(or perfect) security provides the highest level of secrecy: no information at all
can be deduced from an encrypted data fragment. In the case of computational
security, an attacker disposing of enough time and computational resources can
deduce some information from fewer fragments than the minimum amount re-
quired for data reconstruction. When it is possible to obtain some information
about the encrypted data we talk about the lowest, incremental, level of security.
Three categories of algorithms may be associated with these three protec-
tion levels. The first category contains secret sharing techniques providing
information-theoretic security. The second one gathers techniques computa-
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tional secret sharing methods, especially all fragmentation algorithms based on
symmetric encryption. Information Dispersal Algorithms (IDA) and straight-
forward techniques like decimation, characterized by a lower - often insufficient
to be used as the only protection - confidentiality level, form the third group.
Following subsections describes in more details each of the three categories.
Table 2 gathers the most important in the context of distributed storage frag-
mentation techniques from all categories and compares their protection strength,
performance and capacity of providing data resilience in addition to data secu-
rity.
2.1.1 Perfect secret sharing schemes
Perfect (or information-theoretically secure) secret sharing schemes transform
data d into n fragments, each of a size equal to the size of d. Any k of these
fragments suffice to recover original information, while k − 1 fragments do not
provide any information about the initial data, even if an attacker possesses un-
limited computational resources. Large fragment size and in consequence huge
storage overhead are a serious disadvantage of perfect secret sharing. There-
fore, techniques from this category are often judged unpractical to be applied
on voluminous data and rather used for protection of small data, typically en-
cryption keys. Nevertheless, three of five academic systems from Table 3 adopt
perfect secret sharing for data protection, judging the increase of storage as an
acceptable cost. POTSHARDS and GridSharing chose XOR splitting because
of its fast performance. PASIS accepts the use of perfect security in some cases.
However, the system does not predefine its data protection technique: once the
nature of the data is known, an appropriate algorithm is chosen from a range of
perfect, incremental and computational threshold schemes. Details of a mindful
choice of a data distribution scheme inside PASIS were described in [58].
Shamir’s secret sharing A (k, n)-threshold Shamir’s secret sharing scheme
(SSS) [49] takes as input data d and transforms them into n fragments f1, ..., fn,
of which at least k are needed for data recovery. The algorithm is based on
the fact that given k unequal points x1, ..., xk and arbitrary values f1, ..., fk
there is at most one polynomial y(x) of degree less or equal to k − 1 such
that y(xi) = fi, i = 1, ..., k. In more details, Shamir’s scheme uses modular
arithmetic. The set of integers modulo a prime number p forms a field in which
interpolation is possible. In order to encode data d a prime number p is picked,
which is greater than d and n. The coefficients a1,..,ak−1 of the polynomial yd(x)
are randomly chosen from a uniform distribution over the integers in [0, p) and
the values f1,..,fn are computed modulo p.
In SSS, the fragmentation consists of computing a value of the polynomial
yd(x) at n points x1, ..., xn. The complexity of computing a value at single
point is O(n). Therefore, it takes O(n2) to compute a polynomial of degree n
at n points. To defragment data we need to recover the constant term of the
polynomial yd(0). This is also an operation quadratic in function of k. In case
of larger data, Shamir advises to break the initial data into a set of smaller
data chunks and apply the fragmentation processing to each chunk separately.
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Moreover, implementations of the scheme usually optimize its performance for
larger data by performing all of the operations in a finite field GF (28), adopted
to the nature of byte computations2.
Shamir’s scheme was primarily designed to protect encryption keys. In this
use case, its quadratic complexity and huge storage overhead are acceptable,
but in the context of storage of larger data they may be a serious burden.
Nevertheless, the scheme was taken into account as one of the protection method
inside the PASIS system. Moreover, POTSHARDS used it as a way to add
redundancy to already protected data fragments.
Around the same time than Shamir, Blakley [7] published his own scheme
relying on the fact that any n nonparallel (n-1)-dimensional hyperplanes in-
tersect at only one specific point. However, it did not find application inside
distributed storage systems.
XOR-splitting XOR-splitting is an easy and very fast way of implementing
an all-or-nothing scheme. The technique relies on the one-time pad encryption
technique [50]. In order to obtain n final data fragments, n − 1 random frag-
ments are generated and one additional fragment is calculated, which XOR-ed
with other fragments will give the initial data back. In contrary with other
secret sharing schemes found in distributed systems, this method does not pro-
vide data redundancy in addition to secrecy. In order to achieve resilience of
protected data, XOR-splitting has to be combined with another technique, like
data replication (GridSharing), information dispersal or a (k, n)-threshold secret
sharing (POTSHARDS).
Ramp schemes Blakley and Meadows (1985) [8] first introduce ramp
schemes, in which data are broken into n fragments, such that any k of them al-
lows data recovery and fewer than p fragments reveal no information at all. The
main idea behind ramp schemes is to gain on efficiency by relaxing on security
requirements. The linear ramp scheme, one of the most important type of ramp
schemes, takes as input m data chunks of initial information and k −m other
predetermined types of inputs (some of them may be random). From these two
inputs it produces n final fragments in a way that the m data chunks can be
reconstructed from any k of the fragments (this can be achieved by applying
any information dispersal algorithm). In the context of distributed storage,
ramp schemes have been considered by the PASIS system. Li, Qin, Lee, and
Li (2001) [32] proposed Convergent Ramp Secret Sharing Scheme (CRSSS), a
modification of the linear ramp scheme conceived to be used for data disper-
sal in a cloud-of-clouds. CRSSS replaces random information inside a classical
ramp scheme with deterministic hashes generated from the initial data. Such
processing allows further fragments deduplication (deduplication is described in
details in Section 2.10).
2.1.2 Computationally secure algorithms
Computational secret sharing methods (including all application of symmetric
key encryption to fragmentation) provide with a lower protection level than
2http://manpages.ubuntu.com/manpages/xenial/man7/gfshare.7.html
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perfect secret sharing, but significantly optimize the size of produced fragments.
Secret Sharing Made Short In [29], Krawczyk introduces Secret Shar-
ing Made Short (SSMS): a space-efficient way of protecting information using
a combination of perfect secret sharing and data dispersal. Initial data are en-
crypted with a randomly generated key and then transformed into n fragments
using an information dispersal algorithm (IDA) (see ?? for more about IDAs),
k of which are needed for data reconstruction. The key is fragmented using a
perfect (k, n)-threshold scheme and such n key fragments are attached to pre-
viously produced n data fragments. To recover data, a user has to gather k
fragments. He reconstructs the key using perfect secret sharing, recovers en-
crypted data from k fragments using information dispersal and then decrypts
data with the recovered key. SSMS does not only optimize the storage blow-up,
but has a better performance than Shamir’s scheme. It is still considered as one
of fragmentation methods inside modern cloud-base solutions [11]. However,
most systems chose to combine encryption with systematic error correction in-
stead of information dispersal, as it allows an even more faster processing[45].
For instance, Symform divides (in a straightforward way) encrypted data in
64 fragments and adds then 32 redundant fragments using error correction. A
more sophisticated combinations of encryption and resilience make use of all-
or-nothing transforms.
AONT-RS and CAONT-RS The all-or-nothing (AONT) encryption mode
was first proposed by Rivest (1997) [46]. It consists of two steps: a package
transform followed by an ordinary encryption. The package transform takes
as input initial data divided into blocks ( same blocks as during a block ci-
pher encryption) and transforms the blocks in a way that it is not possible
to recover them when even one of the transformed block is missing. This is
achieved by encrypting the blocks with a pseudo-random key and producing
one additional fragment that is the exclusive-or of the pseudo-random key and
a hash for each transformed chunk. Resch and Plank (2011) adopted a variant
of the AONT inside their AONT-RS technique. AONT-RS first transforms data
into k fragments using a all-or-nothing transform and then uses a systematic
version of Reed-Solomon error correction coding to produce n − k redundant
fragments. The all-or-nothing transformation inside AONT-RS slightly differs
from the package transform initially proposed by Rivest. First modification, a
known value is appended to data prior to encryption, so it is possible to check
data integrity and it is not possible for an attacker to corrupt data while having
less than required threshold of fragments. Second difference is that the hash
function is applied only once over the whole initial data and not one by one on
single blocks of data. This improves the performance of the technique and allows
the use of both, block and stream ciphers. Data transformed using AONT-RS
are not envisaged to be encrypted a second time. Therefore, a brute-force at-
tack on the random key used for the AONT pass can be envisaged leading to
he decryption of the fragments in the possession of an attacker. AONT-RS is
applied for distributed storage inside the IBM Cloud Object Storage.
Li et al. (2001) introduced CAONT-RS, a modified version of AONT-RS
that allows fragments’ deduplication. In CAONT-RS the random key used for
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the AONT transform is replaced with a cryptographic hash generated from
the initial data. A version of CAONT-RS was employed inside the CDStore
system. Its AONT processing step uses optimal asymmetric encryption padding
(OAEP)[3, 10] instead of a block cipher encryption, but the rest of processing
remains the same.
SecureParser R© also makes of AONT, but instead of applying it to data it
uses it to protect the keys. The kind of the AONT is not publicly specified.
2.1.3 Incremental security
The last category of algorithms contains mainly the family of information dis-
persal algorithms. Other methods, like for instance data decimation (just men-
tioned by PASIS) did not attract attention in the context of distributed storage.
Information dispersal algorithms Rabin (1989) [44] was the first to intro-
duce the concept of an information dispersal algorihm (IDA). An IDA fragments
data of size dsize into n fragments of size dsize/ k each, so that any k fragments
suffice for reconstruction. In more details, the dispersal is realized by multiply-
ing initial data (in form of a vector of size k) by a k × n nonsingular generator
matrix that generates n data fragments. Data recovery process is the direct
inverse of fragmentation: any k fragments are multiplied by the inverse of the
generator matrix. Rabin’s IDA is mainly used for fault-tolerant storage and
information transmission. For security applications, it is usually considered as
not being sufficient as the only protection. Indeed, a pattern appears when all
vectors of data are fragmented using same generator matrix. A similar problem
occurs when using the Electronic Code Book block cipher mode for block cipher
encryption [?]. Nevertheless, when applied on already encrypted data, IDA adds
redundancy and strengthen protection (like in previously described Krawczyk’s
scheme). Li (2012) [31] analyzed in a more precise way the confidentiality of
IDAs. He considers that Rabin’s IDA has strong confidentiality, because the
original data cannot be explicitly reconstructed from fewer than the m required
fragments, contrarily to some weak confidentiality IDAs where it is possible to
recover plaintext from less than the required amount of fragments. Further-
more, he presented an effective way of constructing an IDA from an arbitrary k
of n erasure code.
IDAs confidentiality level is quite low, but they have (in some cases) advan-
tages over other techniques. For instance, their space efficient size of fragments
make them more suitable than perfect secret sharing for protecting data in mo-
tion as it limits the bandwidth usage. Computational secret sharing provides
similar fragment size and better confidentiality than IDAs, but for low values
of k IDAs show better performance[45]. Recently, several works focused on
a way of providing a lightweight and space efficient fragmentation algorithm
that would get rid off the pattern preservation problem of incrementally se-
cure algorithms. Cincilla, Boudguiga, Hadji, and Kaiser (2015) [14] proposed a
mechanism for partitioning data in a multi-cloud environment at a lower time
overhead than classical cryptographic techniques. The core of its processing is
based on data shredding combined with a data pattern elimination technique.
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Kapusta, Memmi, and Noura (2016) introduce a keyless efficient algorithm for
data fragmentation that overcome the data pattern problem [28].
2.2 Data redundancy
A resilient distributed storage system should ensure data redundancy, as it has
to be prepared for the lost or alteration of a part of its data in case of an attack
or incident. The exact amount of n − k redundant fragments should depend
mainly on the trustworthiness of the machines and planned longevity of the
system. Indeed, data dispersed over unreliable machines (like in a peer-to-peer
system) are more likely to be lost or altered. At the same time, it is easier
to plan an efficient data protection strategy if the longevity of the system is
measured in years rather than decades.
All of analyzed systems add redundancy to the stored data in order to coun-
termeasure integrity and availability problems. As presented in Figure 1, the
performance of techniques producing data redundancy varies from slow (sharing
schemes) to fast (data replication). Nevertheless, the choice of the best tech-
nique is not straightforward: not only performance, but also other factors, like
the impact on data protection or the increase of the required storage capacity,
have to be taken into account.
Figure 1: Comparison of redundancy techniques used in bitwise storages systems
based on fragmentation.
Replication is the easiest and fastest solution, but also the most inefficient
in terms of memory occupation. It was chosen by GridSharing, where data
fragments are replicated over multiple servers and for each of user requests
several replicas of the same fragments are retrieved. This strategy protects
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against data byzantine-faulty storage servers, as the user will choose the replica
that appeared in the majority of answers. IBM Object Cloud Storage also
applies replication, but only on smaller files, where the gain in performance
prevails over the storage blow-up.
(k, n)-threshold schemes and information dispersal algorithms provides not
only data privacy, but also redundancy. In the case of perfect secret sharing,
strong data protection with additional data resilience comes at a cost of huge
increase of memory, same as for replication. Moreover, the performance of such
schemes is much slower than of the other techniques. Shamir’s secret sharing was
adopted by POTSHARDS long-term storage system. Data fragments split us-
ing XOR-splitting techniques are fragmented one more time using the Shamir’s
scheme. Such combination provides very high data protection at a cost of large
memory use. For systems other than archival it may be judged too excessive.
Information dispersal algorithms (IDA) solve the problem of storage blow-up,
but their security level is rarely sufficient. Therefore, they are applied in addi-
tion to another method, like in Krawczyk’s scheme where encrypted data are
fragmented using an IDA. Such double processing is less efficient than symmet-
ric error correction, where redundant fragments are added to already existing
ones. In consequences, except DepSky, all of the systems using symmetric en-
cryption for data protection have chosen error correction (different versions of
the Reed-Solomon code) to generate data redundancy.
2.3 Performance
The overall performance of a bitwise fragmentation system depends on vari-
ous elements. Two more factors have to be taken into consideration in com-
parison with a classical distributed storage system: the performance overhead
of fragmentation and defragmentation processing, as well as the latency delay
caused by data dispersal. A rough analysis of performance of bitwise fragmen-
tation techniques is shown in Figure 2 based on benchmarks found in the litera-
ture [45, 11, 33, 32]. Two information-theoretic algorithms are on the two ends
of the comparison: Shamir secret sharing is the slowest algorithm in contrary
to the XOR-split that is the fastest method. The rest of the algorithms may be
regrouped into two groups: a first one containing techniques using information
dispersal (IDA, RSSS, CRSSS) and a second gathering techniques mixing sym-
metric encryption with systematic error-correction (AONT-RS, CAONT-RS).
A comparison of performance and complexity of these two groups is not obvious
as it depends on several parameters like the number of fragments k, as well as
the exact choice of the hash and encryption algorithms inside the AONT trans-
form. In a general manner, for large values of k (approximately above 10) the
second group outperforms the first one, while for smaller values of k information
dispersal seems to be a more efficient solution. Inside the groups the classifi-
cation is easier. Convergent versions of algorithms are slower than the origi-
nal ones, as they require additional cryptographic hash operations. However,
the most recent version of CAONT-RS improves the performance of AONT-
RS by replacing AONT based on AES with an AONT based on OAEP [3, 33].
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Krawczyk’s SSMS proposal is not precising the details of the techniques that
it exploits. Its implementation that uses Rabin’s IDA and Shamir’s scheme is
faster than secret sharing and slower than information dispersal [11]. Perfor-
mance burden caused by latency is inevitable: the risk of delays increase with
the dispersion scope. Several techniques of dealing with latency issues have been
proposed: parallelization of the fragmentation processing, over-requesting (PA-
SIS), keeping track of the most responsive storage nodes (PASIS, IBM Cloud
Object Storage). [TODO:more about lattency?]
Figure 2: Performance comparison of bitwise fragmentation techniques.
2.4 Key and fragments’ location management
In a secure distributed storage system encryption keys are usually stored inside
one or more trusted nodes [TODO: add reference]. Inside bitwise fragmenta-
tion systems a classical key management store is not always necessary. The
fragmentation processing often does not require any key (i.e, secret sharing) or
it disperses the key within the fragments (i.e, SSMS, AONT-RS). However, in
such situation the key is somehow replaced by a map - a piece of information
containing the location and order of the fragments and mapping fragments to
their corresponding data. Even if it is less critical than a key, this map should be
stored in a trusted location or distributed over different nodes, as its possession
facilitates the work of an attacker. Giving the map to the data owner is a risky
solution, as the probability that the owner will loss the map increases with the
supposed data longevity [51].
From all of the described bitwise fragmentation systems only Delta-4 and
Symform do not process keys and store them in a trusted part of the system
(Cloud Control for Symform and security sites for Delta-4). The rest of the
systems use keyless techniques or fragments the keys in addition to data. In all
the cases some metadata has to be added to the fragments, so the systems can
identify the fragments. Then a map with references to the fragments is stored
in one trusted place, distributed over several nodes of the system, or given
to users. Encrypting fragments’ metadata enforces data protection [?]. An
interesting design is proposed by POSHARDS, where not only the user possess
the map of his data fragments, but a sort of distributed map, called approximate
pointers, is attached to the fragments. Thus, data recovery is possible even if
the map was lost. However, approximate pointers are constructed in a way that
the emergency recovery takes much more time than the standard procedure, as
well as require access rights to considerably more storage nodes. This protects
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against the use of the approximate pointers by an attacker. The procedure
of data recovery using approximate pointers is described in more details in
Section2.11.4.
2.5 Data integrity and authentication
Dispersed fragments may be altered, especially when they are stored on un-
trusted devices. Ensuring data integrity can be realized in several ways . The
most common solution is to use cryptographic hash algorithms to add digests to
data before the are being fragmented. It is then possible to verify the integrity
of defragmented data by computing their hash and comparing it with the one
that was received within the fragments. Data integrity verification based on
hashes is present in majority of academic systems. Three of them use signa-
tures (POTSHARDS, DepSky) or the keyed-hash message authentication code
(SecureParser R©) to provide not only data integrity, but also authenticate the
fragments. Digests are usually dispersed within the fragments, but it is not
always the case. In Symform the encryption key required for data defragmen-
tation is generated from the data hash. Keys (and integrity values at the same
time) are then stored in a central trusted element, as they have to be protected.
Ensuring the user does not receive corrupted or incomplete fragments can be
also realized basing on a voting system (GridSharing). Fragments are replicated
over several nodes. During defragmentation process, several replicas of the
same fragment are retrieved. From all the replicas that were fetched, the most
frequent answer is chosen. Such solution is quite inefficient in terms of storage
capacity and lowers the dispersal protection (replicated data are more exposed),
but may be faster as no hash computation is required.
Last approach to data integrity requires an auditing of the distributed system
(PASIS). Activity on storage nodes is tracked down and all recorded changes
are verified. In the case of a data loss or undesired data modification, the state
of the node will be reverted.
2.6 Data defragmentation
Defragmentation is the processes of reconstructing initial data. Two scenarios
may be distinguished. In the first one, the location of the fragments is known,
unless a major failure occurs in the system. Once the fragments are localized,
the data defragmentation process - including collecting fragments, integrity ver-
ification, decryption and fusion - can be performed.
The loss of the map is a critical situation. A straightforward solution to this
problem would be to broadcast a request to all of the storage nodes in order to
discover fragments location. However, this will work only if fragments have a
piece of information attached to them describing their origin and order. POT-
SHARDS is the only system addressing explicitly the issue of map unavailability
by integrating a distributed map within the fragments in addition to the one
given to a user.
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It is important to consider latency while designing the defragmentation pro-
cedure, as it is even more important than the fragmentation time. Indeed, a
user can just upload data and do not wait for the fragmentation to be finished
in contrary to a situation when they make a request for data and wait for the
data recovery.
2.7 Trustworthiness
Three principal levels of device trustworthiness may be distinguished inside a
distributed storage system: trusted, untrusted and curious-but-honest. Trusted
devices are physically secured. Usually they belong to the user or they are parts
of the storage system. They are used for processing (fragmentation, defrag-
mentation, naming) of the plaintext, as well as for storage of data maps and
encryption keys if they exist. In each of analyzed systems there must be at least
one element that is trusted: the one performing the transformation of plaintext
into fragments. In most of them it is integrated with the client appliance (PA-
SIS, IBM Cloud Object Storage, GridSharing, SecureParser, DepSky, CDStore,
Delta-4). In some it is a separate part of the architecture (IBM Cloud Object
Storage, Potshards, Symform, Delta-4). Intuitively, the communication to and
from this component must be secured: a man-in-the-middle attack would reveal
all fragments to an attacker. Solutions for providing data security at motion usu-
ally rely on encrypted communication, like the use of TLS/SSL. Delta-4 evokes
a less typical idea of obfuscating the transmission by mixing fragments of dif-
ferent data (and additional decoys if needed) into one flow during transmission
from user workstation to storage nodes. Curious-but-honest (or semi-honest) is
an expression describing storage nodes or data providers that may try to learn
as much as possible about the data they are storing, but they will run the pro-
tocols exactly as specified. Untrusted elements can not only analyze possessed
data, but also deviate from the protocol.
The question of a secure processing is unavoidable in case of outsourced data
and concerns both categories of data: unstructured (analyzed in this section)
and with uneven confidentiality levels (described in the section 3). A way the-
oretical way of addressing this issue could be seen in the use of homomorphic
encryption [23]. However, Fully Homomorphic Encryption is currently imprac-
tical and Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption has limited applications areas.
Multi-party computation seems a much more promising direction for following
years [19]. Searchable encryption may easy
2.8 Fragment size
The knowledge of fragment size opens the door to a potential side-channel at-
tack. For instance, data fragments obtained with perfect secret sharing have
the size of the data and fragments coming from computational or incremental
techniques have the size of data divided by k. This fact may not only indicate
to an attacker the data size, but also it can help finding out what fragments
are belonging to the same fragmentation result (as fragments of the same size
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most probably will be part of the same fragmentation result). A way to coun-
termeasure this problem is to define one fragment size inside the system: data
are then first divided into chunks that of such size. If an exact division is not
possible, data are padded to be a multiple of the given size. Such padding may
be seen as a sort of decoy. Choice of the size of a data chunk has to be mindful:
a smaller data chunk limits the overhead of padding (especially when a lot of
files are smaller than required chunk size), but increase the costs of processing
(naming and mapping of fragments). One could also imagine a different type of
data division into chunks of various size that would also obfuscate information
about the size of stored file. Beside security reasons, data division into chunks
may speed up the system performance as it enables parallelization of process-
ing.The size of fragments in described systems is usually left unspecified. Only
Symform defines one exact size of its data fragments (described in 2.11.8).
Data chunks are not always constructed from consecutive bytes of the initial
data. Delta-4 builds them by decimating the data: one byte of k goes to a
one fragment. SecureParser R© allows the use of a more complex processing in
addition to encryption, involving splitting of data at a bit level. A similar bit
scrambling transformation was proposed in LightBlind [14] as an alternative to
data encryption: bits of data are dispersed to different providers in a way that
single fragments do not conserve patterns of the original data.
2.9 Decoys
Decoys are fragments that have the role of misleading a potential intruder. They
may be implemented in two ways. First way consist in generating fragments that
do not belong to any initial data and mixing them with valid fragments. Such
additional portion of data obfuscates the exact amount and size of stored frag-
ments, but increase the storage requirements. An alternative and more efficient
way of processing consists in injecting invalid entries to the map containing mis-
leading locations of the fragments. Therefore, already existing fragments (but
matching different data files) are used as decoys. Such technique was adopted
by POTSHARDS, where in the secondary map only one entry out of four leads
to a valid fragment. A technique employing decoys has been already proposed
by the authors of Mnemosyne: a steganographic peer-to-peer storage system
providing not only data privacy, but also plausible deniability of its stored data
[24].
2.10 Data deduplication
Data deduplication is a technique exploiting content similarity of data to reduce
the overall storage space inside a system [42, 32]. Duplicate copies of same
data are stored only once. This may be easily done by identifying data using
their hash. The method works especially well for archival systems storing a
big amount of similar data, for instance backup files (as consecutive versions
of backup files usually do not significantly differ). Deduplication in a bitwise
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fragmentation system prohibits any randomness inside the applied fragmenta-
tion technique. Indeed, secret sharing or encryption produce different outputs
when applied on the same data, as their fragmentation output depends on a
random input element (i.e., random coefficients or random encryption key). In
an unmodified form, only information dispersal algorithms allows data dedupli-
cation when the dispersal matrix remains the same for all fragmented data. It
is however possible to easily adapt a fragmentation technique to deduplication
purposes by replacing the random element by deterministic data constructed
from hashes of the data. Thus, CAONT-RS and CRSSS techniques were pro-
posed [32] that modify the AONT-RS and RSSS algorithms. The use of dedu-
plication is space efficient, but - when the systems is designed in a naive way - it
opens the door to side-channel attacks. An attacker eavesdropping the commu-
nication between a user and the system nodes may for instance deduce if user’s
data exists already inside the system. A two stages deduplication, proposed by
CDStore, provides a solution to this problem.
2.11 Systems characteristics
2.11.1 Delta-4
Delta-4 [40] was one of the first project to address the need for a dependable
distributed storage system, that will resist accidental faults and intentional in-
trusions. The system environment is comprised of three separated areas: a
user, a security and an archive site. The user site is a trusted area composed of
users’ workstations, where data fragmentation and defragmentation occur dur-
ing user sessions. The archive site stores dispersed data fragments. The totality
of the archival nodes is considered as trusted, but single nodes are individually
untrusted: they may be subject to accidental faults and malicious intrusions.
Security sites have to be trusted. They handle authentication and authorization
of users, as well as store and manage fragmentation keys.
Data processing is based on the fragmentation-redundancy-scattering (FRS)
technique [18, 21]. In a pre-processing step data are cut into data chunks of
equal size, that are referred to as pages. Padding is applied when the data size
is not a multiple of the size of a page. Pages are then encrypted with a chained
cipher, in a way that the preceding cipher text is necessary for the recovery of the
following plaintext. Data from a ciphered page are then decimated byte by byte
over k fragments. Such processing creates dependency between ciphered data
inside fragments, so a partial defragmentation is not possible without guessing
the missing part of the data. Data integrity is ensured by the use of crypto-
graphic checksums that are added at the beginning of each page. k fragments
corresponding to one page are then replicated n times and broadcasted to the
archive sites. A pseudo-random algorithm is used to decide if a site will store
the given fragment or not by taking into account the relative space at each
site. Apart of balancing the available space among different sites, the algorithm
obfuscates the actual locations of the replicas. In Delta-4, the replication was
chosen because of performance reasons, as thirty year ago CPU cycles were to
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scarce to efficiently execute error-correction or information dispersal. Since all
fragments are sent to all storage nodes reducing the bandwidth by decreasing
the size of transmitted data is paramount importance [58]. An interesting con-
cept of decoy use is evoked: during communication between a user site and the
storage nodes, the fragments of a single file are supposed to be drown into a
flow of different fragments (if necessary this flow may be artificially created).
Fragments naming is realized at the user sites. A unique name is added
to each of the fragments, derived from the fragmentation key, the name of the
data file, the index of the page and the index of the fragment. Thus, even if
an attacker obtains all the required fragments for a given data file, they will
have to find out the right ordering of the data fragments. The fragmentation
key used for naming and data fragmentation is stored using secret sharing by
the security site. At the beginning of a user session it is transmitted to the user
site. It is not possible for an attacker to find any relevant data inside a user
workstation except during a running session.
2.11.2 PASIS
The objective of PASIS [59, 22] project is similar to the one of Delta-4: design-
ing a storage system capable to handle storage nodes failures and activity of
malicious users. System architecture includes PASIS storage nodes (vulnerable
to attacks and intrusions) equipped with repair agents and client systems with
installed PASIS agents (trusted areas). Storage nodes are self-securing: their
repair agents internally version all data and requests for a certain amount of
time [52]. Keeping history information allows the detection of intrusions and
prevents intruders from destroying or undetectably tampering with stored data.
Systems administrators have a window of time to recognize malicious activity
and rebuild the old state of the system using the history pool. A major dif-
ference between a self-securing storage like PASIS and a conventional backup
system is that the security perimeter in the first one is situated around the
storage device.
Because of the belief that no single data distribution scheme fits all data
types and systems, the fragmentation method in PASIS is not predefined, but
adapted to the particular kind of data to be stored and to the current system
performance. Details of a mindful selection of a fragmentation scheme for a
survivable storage system were described by Wylie et al. (2001) [58]. Basically,
the final choice of a p-m-n threshold scheme for a given data file is a trade-off
between desired performance, data availability and security. A wide range of
techniques and their combinations is taken into account: from replication to
error-correction for data availability and from information dispersal to secret
sharing for data privacy.
A fragment is identified by the name of the storage node and its local name
on that node. A dedicated directory service maps the name of data stored over
storage nodes to their fragments. Therefore, a careful naming of stored files can
obfuscate relations between fragments.
PASIS comes up with two suggestions that aim at improving the perfor-
16
mance of retrieval of the distributed data. First consists in over-requesting of
data fragments: asking storage nodes for more than k fragments during the
data retrieval. This way, only the k first fragments that arrived first are defrag-
mented. However, at the same time the bandwidth usage is increased. Second
suggestion is to send the requests to the storage nodes that have responded the
most quickly during recent retrievals.
2.11.3 GridSharing
GridSharing [53] is another implementation of a distributed storage system,
dating from 2005. It combines a perfect sharing scheme with the replication
of the secret fragments on different devices in order to build a fault-tolerant
and secure distributed system, fulfilling confidentiality, integrity and availability
requirements. According to the authors, choosing perfect sharing schemes for
data protection alleviates problems related to key management.
An interesting idea of possible fragments renewal for additional protection
is developed. It would be based on a periodical replacement of existing data
fragments with new ones. This way an attacker has a much shorter time to
collect all of the fragments required for data recovery. Perfect sharing schemes
(where all of the fragments are required to reconstruct the data, like the XOR
splitting method) allow for the implementation of efficient share renewal pro-
cedures: changing stored fragments without prior data defragmentation. For
imperfect sharing schemes, where possession of fewer fragments than the re-
quired threshold can provide some information, a renewal algorithm has not yet
been developed.
GridSharing accounts for several ways that the storage servers could fail.
They could leak information, revealing their content and state to an adversary,
while executing the specified protocols faithfully. They could be Byzantine
faulty, deviating from the specified protocol or revealing their fragments. They
could also just crash. It introduces a new l-b-c scheme, in which up to l servers
are leakage-only faulty, up to b are Byzantine faulty and up to c servers can
crash.
Subbiah [53] shows high computation overhead of Shamir’s secret sharing
scheme. In GridSharing, a combination of two mechanisms is proposed in or-
der to overcome inevitable performance problems. First, a XOR perfect sharing
scheme is used, where all fragments are needed for secret recovery. Second, frag-
ments are replicated on servers, using a voting system to determine incoherent
fragments. For each share, at least (2b+1) responses must be received. The
value returned by at least (b+1) servers is the correct one.
Two fragment allocation schemes for dispersing data over n servers are pre-
sented. In the first one, called direct approach, servers are arranged in a logical
grid of (l+b+1) rows, with at least (3b+c+1) servers in each row. The data is
split in as many fragments as there are rows. Each fragment is then replicated
along a single row. In the second approach, named GridSharing, each of the
servers contains a couple of fragments. n servers are arranged in the form of a
logical rectangular grid with r rows and n/r columns. As in the first approach,
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servers in the same row replicate the same data.
The GridSharing system comes with stronger security than encryption-based
techniques and provides an easy way of sharing data in a collaborative environ-
ment. The dimensions of the architectural framework may be altered to trade-off
between number of required servers, storage use, as well as recovery computation
time.
2.11.4 POTSHARDS
In 2007, the POTSHARDS [51] project addressed the need for providing a secure
archive with the ability to last for years. Its basic concept is to distribute data
between multiple cooperating organizations forming an archive system.
The authors decided to use secret splitting schemes instead of encryption for
two reasons. First, key management can be expensive over years, as it requires
key replacements, and there is no guarantee that an encryption key will not be
lost. Second, even the strongest encryption is only computationally secure and
can become easily breakable over a finite period of time with the development
of new technologies (as the objective is to protect data for decades).
POTSHARDS encryption works in a two step process. First, random frag-
ments are generated from user data using XOR-splitting, providing information-
theoretical security. Each of those is used to generate a group of shards – data
pieces of the same length as the initial fragment – using Shamir’s threshold
scheme, providing data availability. Shards are then distributed across indepen-
dent organizations. POTSHARDS assures data integrity by the use of algebraic
signatures.
Objects, fragments, and shards can be identified by their IDs. After data
distribution, a user obtains a list of indexes corresponding to their archived ob-
jects. Because it is possible for this list to be lost, shards include additional
portions of information called approximate pointers. Pointers of one shard show
the archive region, where shards from the same object are located. As conse-
quence, a user can recover data from the shards even if all the other information,
such as the index, is lost. An intruder would have to steal all of the shards that
approximate pointers refer to. This implies, among other things, bypassing the
authentication mechanisms of each archive.
In the event of a partial data loss, the archives can collaborate to recover
the missing parts without revealing any information about the encoded con-
tent. They start by agreeing on the destination of the data to be recovered, by
choosing a new fail-over archive. The missing data is then sent to this archive in
several rounds. In a round, each collaborating archive generates a random block
and XORs it with a block of data needed for reconstruction. All those encoded
blocks are XOR-ed together and the result is sent to the fail-over archive, which
also recieves the encoding keys used by the other archives. With all these pieces,
it is able to recompute the lost data.
POTSHARDS provides information-theoretical security and does not require
any key management. With enough time, it is possible to recover data even
if shards location maps have been lost. Collaboration between organizations
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allows to rebuild a lost archive, but also implies a trade-off between secrecy and
reliability. POTSHARDS pays for its goal of providing a long term archive by
requiring a large amount of storage: both the secrecy and the availability splits
are space consuming.
2.11.5 DepSky
DepSky [5] is an academical dispersed storage system built on top of four com-
mercial clouds. This cloud-of-clouds aims to improve data availability, confiden-
tiality and integrity. Indeed, dispersal over multiple providers protects against
a situation when data become lost or unavailable when the storage provider has
been attacked. It is also a Byzantine fault-tolerant, as it is possible to verify if
the data have been corrupted and retrieve only the valid data fragments. More-
over, as each of data hosts stores only a portion of data, the system facilitates
moving data from one provider to another avoiding the vendor lock-in problem.
The system architecture is composed of a set of clients that read and write
data stored over four commercial clouds. To deal with the heterogeneity of cloud
interfaces, DepSky data are encapsulated inside special data units, which exact
implementation depends on the architecture of the storage provider. Each data
unit contains metadata with a set of information, like data version or signature.
Two protocols for data distribution of data units are proposed: DepSky-A
and DepSky-CA. First one does not provide any data confidentiality, but just
disperse replicas of data over clouds in order to increase availability. Moreover,
as data are replicated the overall storage blowup is equal to number of the repli-
cas. DepSky-CA is a secure and space efficient improvement of the DepSky-A.
Data processing follows Krawczyk’s SSMS method. First, data are encrypted
using symmetric encryption (AES). Encrypted data are then encoded into n
fragments by the use of an optimal erasure code (Reed-Solomon). The encryp-
tion key is partitioned into n shares using secret sharing (Shoenmakers’ Publicly
Verifiable Secret Sharing scheme [48]) and such key shares are attached to data
fragments. Data integrity is ensured by the use of n digests, one for each cloud,
inside of the metadata (SHA-1 was used for cryptographic hashes and RSA for
signatures). The system allows the replacement of the secret sharing by a key
distribution infrastructure.
An analysis of DepSky system demonstrates an improvement of the perceived
availability and (in most cases) the access latency, when compared with cloud
providers individually. The cost of such data dispersal was estimated to twice
the cost of using a single data storage provider.
2.11.6 CDStore
CDStore [33] addresses the problem of the storage of backup-data in a multi-
cloud environment. As versions of backup-data may be very similar between
each other, a possibility of data deduplication (a technique where data with
same content are stored only once) optimizes the storage blow-up inside such
an archival system. Once initial data are fragmented the CDStore systems
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stores only fragments that are different from those already archived. Therefore,
fragmentation of two identical data has to result into two identical sets of frag-
ments [43]. To achieve this, a special fragmentation technique named convergent
dispersal [32] is introduced that combines keyless security of dispersal algorithm
and deduplication.
The system architecture is composed of CDStore clients on the user side and
of one CDStore server per each participating cloud. Initial data are first divided
into chunks of variable size. Chunks are then transformed into n fragments
using the Convergent AONT-RS technique (CAONT-RS), k of which will be
needed for data recovery. CAONT-RS is similar to the AONT-RS technique,
except that for performance reasons CAONT-RS replace the Rivest’s AONT
with a all-or-nothing transformation based on optimal asymmetric encryption
padding (OAEP) [3, 10]. Moreover, to allow deduplication instead of a random
key, a key created from the hash of the data is used.
The proposed two stages deduplication method resists against side-channel
attacks (where an attacker can deduce information about data by seeing only
differing fragments being updated to the cloud). First, produced fragments
are deduplicated at the client side between themselves. In a second step, the
remaining fragments are transfered to the CDStore servers that perform the
second deduplication: they will keep only the fragments that are different from
those being already inside the clouds.
Metadata describing initial data is kept inside the CDStore client. Metadata
with information about data fragments is stored inside the CDStore server or
dispersed over multiple CDStore servers using secret sharing (for a higher level
of data security).
2.11.7 IBM Cloud Object Storage
IBM Cloud Object Storage3 (previously Cleversafe R© 4) is one of the first com-
mercial solutions implementing data dispersal as a way to provide security. Its
dispersed storage network offers a complete software and hardware architecture
for private cloud storage. Petabyte scalability and reliability are the key drivers
of the product.
The data is encoded at the source or on dedicated hardware. Users choose
the level of redundancy that they wish the fragmentation to produce. Then, the
data is transformed and encrypted using the AONT-RS approach [45], which
combines the All-or-nothing transform [46] with Reed-Solomon erasure codes.
First, the data is fragmented into same length words, and each word is encrypted
with a random key using the AES-256 algorithm. Subsequently, a SHA-256 hash
value of the data is generated in order to provide an integrity check. The last
word is created by XOR-ing the canary with the key. It is not possible to
reconstruct the data unless someone obtains all the fragments and retrieves the
key from the last word. For availability purposes, IBM Cloud Object Storage
applies a modified version of Rabin’s IDA to the encrypted data, based on
3https://www.ibm.com/cloud-computing/products/storage/object-storage/
4http://www.pcworld.com/article/3130792/ibms-cleversafe-storage-platform-is-becoming-a-cloud-service.html
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Reed-Solomon erasure codes. As a consequence, additional pieces of data are
generated, so the user can reconstruct the data even if some of the pieces are
lost. Fragmented data is dispersed on random storage nodes.
Data must be secured not only in storage, but also during transmission: if
an attacker intercepts the traffic and catches all the fragments, he may recon-
struct the data. To read the objective of secure transport of fragments, IBM
Cloud Object Storage verifies all nodes that would like to join its storage net-
work. Furthermore, data transit is protected by the use of encryption. The
lack of need for key management (the key being included in the data) makes
data management less costly. Once an attacker gains access to the storage (for
example by breaking authentication mechanisms) or succeeds in observing frag-
ments passing through the network, they will have all the elements needed for
data reconstruction. With IBM Cloud Object Storage, data protection relies
on the inability of an attacker to collect the data from multiple locations or to
intercept the traffic of fragments from the storage servers to the client.
A major drawback of the AONT-RS approach is its performance when work-
ing with small objects. IBM Cloud Object Storage introduces a separate way
of processing such data, which does not use time-consuming error correction
codes. Instead, availability of small encrypted data is ensured by replication.
2.11.8 Symform
Symform5 uses a peer-to-peer solution to decrease storage costs and to provide
additional security measures based on dispersion in addition to standard data
encryption.
Symform uses the RAID-96TM patented [55, 56, 57] technology for data pro-
tection and availability. Before being stored in the Symform cloud, data from
a dedicated folder on a user device is divided into 64MB blocks and encrypted
using the AES-256 algorithm. A unique encryption key for each block is gen-
erated from the hash of the block itself. The data is encrypted at the folder
level, so this technique allows a de-duplication of data without decryption: if a
block already exists in the folder, it is not uploaded again. Furthermore, each
block is shredded into 64 fragments of 1MB each. Then, 32 parity fragments are
added to every block using Reed-Solomon codes. This results in 96 fragments
corresponding to one block of the original data. These fragments are randomly
distributed across 96 randomly chosen devices. To reconstruct the protected
data, any 64 out of 96 fragments need to be assembled.
The combination of encryption and fragmentation provides strong computa-
tional security. In order to decrypt a single block of data, a malicious user would
have to locate 64 pieces of information, collect them from the storage devices
and then break the AES-256 encryption, for which the key is twice as long as
the AES-128 recommended by the NIST. This seems to be an insurmountable
effort.
The weak point of the Symform system may be its Cloud Control critical
5http://www.symform.com
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element responsible for management of fragment locations and encryption keys.
An attack on the Cloud Control may result in data unavailability.
2.11.9 SecureParser R©
In 2005, Unisys introduced SecureParser R© [47, 26]. This software solution fulfills
three requirements of secure data storage: security, integrity and safety. It uses
physical separation of data and fault tolerance in order to achieve a better
security level than traditional encryption techniques.
Data security requirement in SecureParser R© is solved in two ways. The first
protection and the core security component is the AES encryption algorithm.
Moreover, the data is split at the bit level using a random value that serves as
the splitting key. This unique processing results in the creation of data shards
containing random bits of the encrypted data, which can then be distributed
over storage nodes. To avoid key managements problems, both keys (encryption
and splitting) are stored inside the data itself using a sort of All-Or-Nothing-
Transform.
For better availability, m of n redundancy can be added to the data before
shards distribution. Therefore, the original data can be restored from m of all n
shards. Moreover, SecureParser R© introduces the concept of a mandatory share:
mandatory shares are required for the proper recovery of the data, regardless
of the m of n specification. It can be interesting in a situation when the user
would like to quickly change the fragmented data - they will only have to change
the mandatory shares. However, it can be seen as a weak point in a situation
when an attacker would like to make the data unavailable: to achieve this, they
only have to destroy one of the mandatory shares. Integrity in SecureParser R©
is assured by adding an authentication value to each of shares.
SecureParser R© claims to provice performance gains over other security prod-
ucts, by performing computations on small blocks of data, and by using the
AES-CTR mode [35], which allow parallel processing.
2.12 Academic approach vs. commercial products
Two distinct trends divide the analyzed systems. The first one aims at opti-
mizing the storage space and performance even at the cost of lower security or
more expensive computations. It is adopted by the commercial solutions, which
tend to use error correction rather than data replication and AES encryption
instead of secret splitting. On the other hand, academic systems focus on provid-
ing strong, information-theoretic security, combined with high data resilience.
Based on secret splitting techniques, they take significantly more storage space.
From that trend come novel solutions, such as repair agents in PASIS, or ap-
proximate pointers in POTSHARDS, which deserve more experimenting and
probing.
Bitwise systems are mainly dedicated to archiving or long-term storage.
They aim at maximizing data protection and providing a good data redun-
dancy at the same time. To achieve this goal they combine various techniques
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like encryption, secret splitting, data replication, error correction and informa-
tion dispersal. A usual data processing strategy includes two steps: one for
security and one for redundancy. The resulting architecture of a storage sys-
tem is often a compromise between desirable fragment confidentiality level and
memory use. Performance and resilience are two other factors that may impact
the design of an appropriate data fragmentation algorithm.
3 Exploiting data structures, multi-level confi-
dentiality, and machine trustworthiness
In case of known data structure, the fragmentation process can proceed by
taking into account the varying need for secrecy along different types of data.
This way, confidential data can be easily separated from non-sensitive informa-
tion and storage places of both parts can be appropriately chosen. There is no
need to provide a specific secure architecture to store a piece of data that does
not reveal anything confidential. This idea was adopted by the authors of the
object-oriented Fragmentation-Redundancy-Scattering (FRS) [18] technique at
the end of the last century. Later, it has been modified to suit database storage
[1, 15] and cloud computing technology [6, 25, 16].
The need of user interaction during the decomposition process is one of the
biggest problems of fragmentation of structured data. It is the user’s responsibil-
ity to provide for each set of data types the rules that define what is confidential
and what is not. Still, it remains possible that a combination of two or more
non-confidential data fragments will reveal information about the confidential
one. This was especially underlined by Ciriani [15].
A way of separating data in two fragments (confidential and non-confidential)
without user interaction was developed in [41].
3.1 Object-Oriented Fragmentation-Redundancy-Scattering
In the 90’s, fragmentation-redundancy-scattering technique (FRS)[18, ?] was
introduce to provide accidental and intentional fault tolerance inside distributed
systems with a limited trusted area. Data are divided into non-confidential
fragments that are then replicated for resilience reasons and scattered over a
large number of nodes. To ensure data protection, the suggestion is to encrypt
confidential data before fragmentation and scattering processing. A version of
the FRS technique uses threshold fragmentation schemes, like Shamir’s, during
the redundancy step.
Processing of confidential data has to be done only on trusted sites (on plain-
text) or using methods like homomorphic encryption (while operating on the
ciphertext). Both ways may be quite costly. Minimizing the amount of con-
fidential data by applying fragmentation at design time would limit the needs
for trusted servers or processing power[20]. Indeed, while designing an appli-
cation, confidential objects may be iteratively substituted by a collection of
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non-confidential objects. This concept was the base for the object-oriented ver-
sion of the FRS technique[12]. In a first step, confidential objects belonging to
an application are fragmented using a redundant algorithm until being broken
into pieces which do not reveal anything sensitive. Redundancy is achieved by
the use of error processing techniques (like error correcting codes) or by antici-
pating the application design at the early stage of designing objects. At the end,
the fragmented data is scattered over various workstations. Leftover fragments,
which are still holding confidential information after the first step, are encrypted
or stored on trusted devices. All remaining pieces are distributed over untrusted
sites. Data processing or defragmentation are performed on trusted sites.
After two decades, the FRS technique was implemented inside two dis-
tributed systems: one peer-to-peer[2] and another one with a central server[13].
3.2 Database fragmentation
Database as a service6 delivers similar functionality to classic, relational, or
NoSQL database management systems while providing flexibility and scalability
of a hosted in a cloud on-demand platform. The DBaaS user does not have to
be concerned with database provisioning issues, as it is the cloud provider’s
responsibility to maintain, backup, upgrade and handle the physical failures of
the database system. It is easy to see that simplicity and cost effectiveness are
the biggest advantages of such solution.
However, data owners lose control over outsourced data. This creates new
security and privacy risks, especially when databases contain sensitive data, such
as health records or financial information. As a consequence, securing database
services has become a need of paramount importance. A solution to the problem
involves encryption of the data before sending it to the storage provider. Large
overhead and query processing limitation are the main drawbacks of such a
blunt approach.
K-anonymization [54], t-closeness [34] and l-diversity [36] anonymization
techniques can be seen as a special case of multilevel confidentiality. Some
progress on this subject, mainly for health data, has been recently performed
[4].
Database fragmentation promises an interesting alternative to database full
encryption or full anonymization. One of the first works on the subject [1] intro-
duces a distributed architecture for preserving data privacy, while authorizing
some processing. A trusted client communicates with the end-users and utilizes
two non-trusted servers belonging to different storage providers (see Figure 3),
ensuring the physical separation of the information to be protected. By con-
struction, storage providers do have access to the information that users entrust
them with. Even if they are well aware that they should not incorrectly interact
with the user’s data and its integrity without endangering their own business, it
is a common assumption to suppose them to be honest but curious: they have
the ability to observe, move, and replicate stored data, especially behind the
6https://www.technologyreview.com/s/414090/designing-for-the-cloud/
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Figure 3: Defragmentation in a trusted zone of information received from two
providers
virtualization mechanism. In [1], the outsourced data is partitioned among the
two untrusted servers in a way that content at any one server does not breach
data privacy. In order to obtain valuable information, an adversary must gain
access to both databases. By analogy, the system is also protected from insider
attacks and the curiosity of the providers as long as they do not ally together.
On top of that, queries involving only one of the fragments are executed much
more efficiently than on encrypted data. Nevertheless, this privacy-preserving
outsourcing solution has a serious limitation. It assumes that the two servers
are not allowed to communicate with each other. In a real life scenario such a
condition can be hard to guarantee. The trusted zone is an essential element
in Aggarwal’s solution. All of the presented systems must include at least one
trusted element in their architecture: the one in which the fragmentation and
defragmentation processes will occur.
Another work [15, 16] protects sensitive information by mixing encryption
and fragmentation. It defines confidentiality constraints as a subset containing
one or more relation attributes. A constraint involving only one attribute implies
that the value of the attribute is sensitive and the only way of protecting it is the
use of encryption. On the other hand, multi-attributes constraints specify that
only associations between attributes of a given constraint are sensitive. In that
case, there is no need to encrypt all the attributes values, because confidentiality
can be ensured by fragmentation.
In [15, 16], three scenarios of fragmenting a relation are presented. In the first
one, a relation is divided into two fragments, which does not contain sensitive
combination of unencrypted attributes. In the second scenario, the relation is
split into multiple fragments in a way that any query can always be evaluated on
one of the fragments: each fragment contains unencrypted attributes that do not
violate confidentiality constraints, as well as the encrypted representation of all
other attributes. The last fragmentation scenario avoids the use of encryption
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by introducing a trusted area (belonging to the data owner) for the storage of
sensitive portion of data.
For each scenario, the authors present fragmentation metrics supporting the
definition of an appropriate fragmentation algorithm. Fragmentation metrics
can aim at minimizing the number of fragments, maximizing affinity between
attributes stored in one fragment or minimizing querying costs.
Recently, Bkakria [6] generalized this approach to a database containing mul-
tiple relations. It introduces a new confidentiality constraint for the protection
of relationships between two tables. Sensitive associations between relations
are secured by the protection of primary key/foreign key relationships and the
separation of the involved relations. Relations are transformed into secure frag-
ments in which subsets of attributes respecting confidentiality constraints are
stored in plaintext, while all others are encrypted. It introduces a parameter for
evaluating the query execution cost and proposes a query transformation and op-
timization model for executing queries on distributed fragments. It also focuses
on the issue of preserving data unlinkability while executing queries on multiple
fragments. Indeed, providers have to build a coalition and then deduct informa-
tion by observing query execution. To avoid such situation, [6] proposes the use
of an improved Private Information Retrieval (PIR) [38] technique, which allows
querying a database without revealing query results to service providers. Re-
sults of implementation of the proposed approach are presented. Although the
modified PIR solution is much faster than its predecessor, the processing time
of record retrieval from multiple fragments is considerably slower in comparison
with querying a single fragment.
The idea of splitting a database into fragments stored at different cloud
providers was also proposed by Hudic [25]. In this approach, a database is first
normalized and then several security levels (high, medium, low) are attributed
to relations. Based on these three levels and specific user requirements, data is
encrypted, stored at local domain or distributed between providers.
Database fragmentation methods presented in this paper remain limited in
terms of number of fragments that does not exceed dozens. Moreover, in each
case, the proposed fragmentation algorithms require user interaction in order to
define data confidentiality level.
4 Conclusion
In previous sections, we analyzed existing distributed storage systems provid-
ing additional secrecy by use of fragmentation. We also presented database
fragmentation solutions separating data in order to avoid full encryption. Few
systems focus on providing a long term, secure and non-costly data storage. An-
other motivation is the possibility of minimizing encryption inside databases,
while still providing a good level of data protection.
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4.1 Fragmentation: issues and recommendations
In order to design an efficient storage systems for fragmented data, some prob-
lems still have to be overcome.
First, a process of fragment dispersion requires data being separated securely.
A situation where data is fragmented, but where we would not or could not
control where fragments are stored has to be considered a weak solution. Using
multiple, independent providers can be a rapid and coarse-grained solution [25],
since it entails significant latency costs.
An alternative could be the storing of the data at a single provider site that
guarantees physical separation. Unfortunately, the majority of cloud providers
use virtualization, which prevents the end user from such control. With the
development of bare-metal [?] clouds like TransLattice Storm [?], Internap [?]
or Rackspace OnMetal [?], we believe it could be possible to control physical
location of outsourced data within a single provider’s site.
Second, there are not enough published studies on performance of dispersed
storage systems to allow for a comparison with the more common ones. In any
case, fragmenting for security increases latency inside the system.
Nevertheless, a good fragmentation technique must be combined with the
parallelization of processing to reach an acceptable overall performance. It
should also take into consideration the fact that, for a collection of fragments,
uneven levels of confidentiality may justify different levels of protection.
This last idea has been successfully developed by Qiu [41] for the selective
encryption of images using a general purpose GPU.
Last but not least, the fragmentation of structured data strongly depends
on user guidance for the definition of the confidentiality levels and depends a
lot on the nature of the dataset. Designing an algorithm for automatically or
semi-automatically separating confidential data from non-sensitive pieces would
make the storage process much faster and easier to use.
4.2 Future work
We plan to design a bitwise general scalable architecture that combines secu-
rity with resilience while optimizing storage space and costs. This solution will
leverage a large number of servers organized in public clouds or private dis-
tributed systems. At the same time, it will be cost effective, efficient in terms
of performance and effective in terms of protection.
Figure 4 illustrates one of the principles driving the architecture of our
planned system. In the first approach, we divide the data into three cate-
gories based on the level of confidence: ultra-confidential, confidential and non-
confidential. This multi-level security division will not focus on the problem
of access control usual to such data categorization. It will be based on the
risk that an owner is willing to take by exposing fragments of data in a public
environment and their acceptance to keep the non-confidential data in an un-
trustworthy public storage space. The confidential data will be protected by
placing it on secure devices.
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Figure 4: Data storage principle regarding data confidentiality level
We distinguish three different storage spaces, adjusted to the chosen data
security levels. Trusted area, most expensive and usually belonging to data
owner or end user, will store the most sensitive data. The rest of the data will
be dispersed to two types of clouds. The non-confidential part of information
will be kept inside popular public clouds that use virtualization. Information
that may potentially reveal a secret will go to bare-metals clouds, which provides
more control of data location than the virtualization-based approach. Obviously,
we are looking at minimizing the amount of data to be stored inside the most
expensive zone and minimizing overall storage cost.
At the end of our work process, we will concentrate on overcoming perfor-
mance issues by a widespread use of parallel processing. As the final and most
important step, we see data dispersion along levels of confidentiality.
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Table 2: Comparison of most relevant bitwise fragmentation techniques. K - size of the encryption key, M - size of the dispersal
matrix, H - size of the integrity canary, R - size of the added data inside a ramp scheme.
Scheme Security Performance Storage Resilience Deduplication
SSS Information-theoretic Cost of evaluating a value of polynomial
of degree k − 1 at n points for each data
chunk
nd Yes No
XOR-split Information-theoretic Cost of k exclusive-or operations kd No No
SSMS Computational Cost of:
• encryption
• information disperal
• perfect sharing scheme for key
nd
k +Kn Yes No
CAONT-RS Computational Cost of:
• producing the encryption key from
hash
• OAEP encryption
• hashing data
• systematic Reed-Solomon
n(d+H)
k +K Yes Yes
AONT-RS Computational Cost of:
• AES encryption
• hashing data
• systematic Reed-Solomon
n(d+H)
k +K Yes No
RSSS Perfect, then incremental Cost of applying an IDA d+Rk n Yes Yes
CRSSS Computational, then
incremental
Cost of:
• producing fragments of R size using
hashes
• applying an IDA
d+R
k n Yes Yes
IDA Incremental Cost of multiplying data by a matrix
k × n
nd
k Yes Yes
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Table 3: Comparison of brute-force data dispersion academic storage systems. Blocks for compromise - number of fragments
needed for data recovery, b -number of Byzantine faulty servers, d - initial data size, k - minimum number of fragments required
for data reconstruction, l -number of leakage faulty servers, n - total number of fragments, n1 -number of fragments in the first
split, n2 -number of fragments in the second split, N - number of servers, p - minimum number of fragments that reveals any
information about data, r -numbe r of servers in a row in the logical grid.Delta-4 PASIS POTSHARDS GridSharing DepSky CDStore
Data secrecy Delta-4 Various threshold
schemes adapted
to information
type
Perfect sharing
scheme: XOR
splitting n1 of n1
Perfect sharing
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Krawczyk’s SSMS
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Threshold
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Table 4: Comparison of brute-force data dispersion commercial storage systems.
Blocks for compromise - number of fragments needed for data recovery, d - initial
data size, k - minimum number of fragments required for data reconstruction,
n - total number of fragments.
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Object
Storage
Symform SecureParser R©
Data
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